This paper argues that the collapse of stock prices in October 1929 generated temporary uncertainty about future income which led consumers to forgo purchases of durable goods. That the Great Crash generated uncertainty is evidenced by the decline in surety expressed by contemporary forecasters. That this uncertainty affected consumer behavior is shown by the fact that spending on consumer durables declined drastically in late 1929, while spending on perishable goods rose slightly. This effect is confirmed by the fact that there is a significant negative relationship between stock market variability and the production of consumer durables in the prewar era.
INTRODUCTION
People who are not economists often view the Great Crash and the Great Depression as the same event. The decline in stock prices in October 1929 and the tremendous decline in real output between 1929 and 1933 are simply seen as part of the same cataclysmic decline of the American economy. In contrast, many economists believe that the two events are at most tangentially related. This conventional economist's view can be seen very clearly in Dornbusch and Fischer's macroeconomics textbook [1984] . They argue that the Great Crash could not have caused the Great Depression because real output started down before stock prices collapsed and because the largest falls in output did not occur until nearly two years later, after the banking panics of 1931.
Despite the dichotomy that economists often impose between the Great Crash and the Great Depression, it is nevertheless the case that the downturn in real output that began in August 1929 accelerated dramatically after the collapse of stock prices. While 602 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS explain fully the acceleration of the real economic decline that began in this period. This suggests that an alternative explanation for the fall in consumer spending in late 1929 may indeed fill a gap in economists' understanding of the onset of the Great Depression.
I. THE UNCERTAINTY HYPOTHESIS
The uncertainty hypothesis investigated in this paper is very straightforward. I argue that the stock market crash of 1929 and the continued gyrations of stock prices throughout 1930 made people nervous about the future of the economy. That is, the extreme stock price variability of this period made people temporarily uncertain about the level of future income. This uncertainty in turn caused consumers to postpone purchases of irreversible durable goods.
A. Intuition
The intuition for why temporary uncertainty might depress consumer spending on durables is exactly analogous to that given in Bernanke [1983] . Consider a consumer deciding whether to buy a durable good that is available in varying levels of quality. When future income is temporarily uncertain and durables purchases are irreversible for long periods of time, there is a trade-off between purchasing the durable and waiting. If the consumer buys the durable, then he obviously gets the utility from the durable. However, the consumer is then locked into the durable before the level of future income is learned. Hence he may choose a quality level that is either too luxurious or too modest relative to his future income, and thus he may be very far from the optimal level of consumption for the life of the durable. On the other hand, if he waits, the consumer is very far from the optimal level of consumption while he is waiting, but he is then able to choose the appropriate durable good once the uncertainty about future income is resolved.
Given this trade-off, it is clear that a temporary rise in uncertainty will tend to increase the value of waiting. In such circumstances, consumers may find it advantageous to put off purchasing durables until they are more certain about the course of future income. A corollary to this finding that a temporary increase in income uncertainty may depress purchases of durable goods is that such a rise in uncertainty may stimulate purchases of nondurables. This occurs because consumers who are not buying durables will have more wealth available to spend on perishable (i.e., highly THE GREAT CRASH AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 603 reversible) goods. This differential behavior of durables and nondurables is an important feature that distinguishes the uncertainty hypothesis from more typical models of consumer behavior. 4 While the preceding analysis of the effects of temporary income uncertainty has focused on consumers, it is clear that this story is also applicable to producers. For producers facing increasing returns, the relative payoff to various investment projects will clearly depend on the level of future income. If producers become temporarily uncertain about future income, then it may be optimal for them to postpone purchases of new plant and equipment until they learn more about the future health of the economy. The effects of uncertainty on producers may in fact have been substantial in 1930. Indeed, such effects could explain why the output of producer durables fell substantially between 1929 and 1930 despite the drop in interest rates and the fairly optimistic forecasts of many business publications. I do not focus on the effect of uncertainty on producers, however, because the behavior of consumers has typically been thought to be more important in this period.
B. Stock Market Variability and Uncertainty
While the intuition given above suggests that temporary income uncertainty could cause a drop in spending on durable goods, there remains the question of how and why an extreme movement in stock prices, such as the Great Crash of October 1929, might have generated widespread temporary uncertainty about future income. The fact that wild gyrations in stock prices cause the future income of stockholders to be more uncertain is one mechanism generating uncertainty. However, it cannot be the main mechanism by which such stock variability generates widespread income uncertainty because even in 1929 less than 2 percent of all American households held stock [Galbraith, 1988, p. 78] .
A simple story about why extreme movements in stock prices cause uncertainty even among consumers who hold no stock starts from the premise that the stock market was thought to be an imperfect predictor of the real economy by consumers in the prewar economy. In this case, standard linear prediction theory indicates 4. Many other models predict that spending on durable goods will decline more than spending on nondurable goods because a larger movement in durables purchases is needed to yield a given change in the flow of durables services. However, these models do not predict that spending on nondurables will literally rise.
604
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS that a larger than usual movement in stock prices will be associated with greater uncertainty about one's prediction of future income.
In the case of the Great Crash, there are more specific reasons to suspect that it generated extreme temporary uncertainty. One scenario that fits with many contemporary accounts is that people realized that the crash could disrupt credit markets and reduce investment. At the same time they were hopeful that the relatively new Federal Reserve System would step in and stabilize or stimulate the economy. These contradictory possibilities following the Great Crash made people particularly uncertain about future income. Hence, both in general and in the particular case of 1929, it seems likely that extreme stock price movements did generate uncertainty about future income.
It is important to point out that this analysis of the effects of the Great Crash on consumer spending is partial equilibrium in two respects. First, it concerns consumer demand taking prices as given; that is, the analysis establishes that stock market variability can shift the aggregate demand curve back, but does not address the question of why a fall in aggregate demand does not simply lead to adjustment of prices. In the case of 1929-1930, the prices of consumer goods move surprisingly little despite large falls in real output. For example, the aggregate consumer price index fell less than 1 percent between October and December 1929 and less than 2 percent between January and June 1930. This stability of prices suggests that an explanation for the fall in aggregate demand in late 1929 is crucial for explaining the fall in real output in the first year of the Great Depression.
Second, the analysis does not take into account the fact that if people knew uncertainty tended to depress consumption, they should have been pessimistic following the Great Crash, not merely uncertain. This is true because a rational consumer would realize that if people became uncertain following the crash, they would cut their consumption and hence cause a decline in output for sure. The neglect of this possibility clearly rests on the assumption that prewar consumers did not know the true model of the economy.
II. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

A. Behavior of Spending
The preceding discussion of the effects of uncertainty on consumption and the role of the stock market in generating uncertainty suggests that one crucial prediction of the uncertainty hypothesis is that following the Great Crash there should have been a noticeable difference in the behavior of consumer spending on durable and perishable goods. Consumer spending on durable goods should have declined sharply following the collapse of stock prices, while spending on perishable goods should have actually risen.
There are two types of data that can be used to examine the behavior of consumer spending following the Great Crash. First, a variety of sources provide monthly data on retail sales of different types of consumer goods for the period around the Great Crash. The best known of the retail sales series is the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) index of department store sales. (The exact sources of this and all the other monthly spending series are given in the notes to Table I .) Department stores carry both durable consumer goods, such as furniture, floor coverings, and china, and semidurable consumer goods, such as clothing, shoes, and linens. Another available sales series that covers similar goods is the total value of sales from the two largest mail-order houses of this period, Montgomery Ward and Sears. A series that covers a purely durable good is new automobile registrations. Because of widespread registration, this series appears to provide a good measure of automobile sales.
There are two retail sales series that show the behavior of sales of nondurable goods. One is the value of sales of the four major five-and-ten-cent store chains. The other is the FRB index of the sales of grocery store chains. Since the FRB discontinued the grocery store sales series in January 1930 because it felt that the index was no longer representative of national grocery store sales, the quality of this series in the late 1920s is clearly somewhat suspect. Despite this flaw, it is useful to have these series on sales of nondurables to compare with the series on spending on durable goods.
Before these retail sales series can be used, it is necessary to make two adjustments. One is to convert them from nominal to real. This is accomplished by deflating using the consumer price index. The second is to adjust them for seasonal variation. This is done by regressing the percentage change of a given series on eleven monthly dummy variables and a constant.
In addition to these monthly retail sales data that are available only for the 1920s, there is an annual series that can be used as a proxy for the consumption of various types of goods for the entire prewar era. The Shaw [1947] series on real commodity output provides annual estimates of the output of durable, semidurable, 606 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS and perishable goods destined for consumers, as well as a measure of total commodity output.5 The obvious flaw in this series is that it is an output series rather than a genuine consumption series. However, at least in the postwar era, the annual output of consumer goods and actual consumption are highly correlated. The main difference between the two series is that output is more cyclically sensitive because inventory investment is procyclical. Provided that the same relationships hold in the prewar era, the Shaw commodity output series should provide a reasonable (albeit excessively volatile) approximation for consumer expenditures. Table I shows the seasonally adjusted monthly percentage changes in retail spending on various types of goods following the Great Crash. These monthly percentage changes have been accumulated starting in October 1929 so that the movement in levels is easier to discern.6 The retail sales series are listed in approximate order of durability, from the most to the least durable. Table I 
B. Consumer Spending and Stock Market Variability
While the behavior of various types of consumer spending following the Great Crash is clearly consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, it is useful to present a more direct test of the uncertainty explanation for the onset of the Great Depression. This test is based on a second prediction of the uncertainty hypothesis: that, in general, extreme stock price variability should tend to depress consumer spending on durable goods and stimulate consumer spending on nondurable goods. These effects of stock price variability should be present regardless of whether the extreme movements are positive or negative, though the direct wealth effects of stock price movements will obviously depend on the sign of the change. If the uncertainty effects of the Great Crash are genuinely to explain the onset of the Great Depression, it should also be the case that the magnitude of the typical effect of stock variability is such that the estimated equation can predict the behavior of consumption in 1930.
While the quarterly, disaggregate consumption data that would be ideal for such a test do not exist before 1947, it is possible to use the Shaw commodity output series described above to examine consumer behavior starting in the late nineteenth century. To implement this test, I do the following. I regress the annual percentage change in the real output of a type of consumer good on its own lagged value, and on the lagged percentage change in total commodity output. These lagged values provide a very simple prediction model for the output of that class of good. To this simple prediction model I add a measure of the variability of real stock prices and the change in the real value of stock prices over the year. The variability measure is included as a proxy for the uncertainty generated by extreme movements in stock prices. The change in the level of real stock prices is included because movements in stock prices can obviously have a wealth effect as well as an uncertainty effect.
The (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) ) from the sample because the unusual events of this period might cause consumer behavior to be highly unusual and because the stock market was closed for several months following the outbreak of the war, making it impossible to compute a consistent variability measure.9
The resulting parameter estimates for equation (1) for the output of consumer durables, semidurables, and perishables are given in Table II . For the output of consumer durables, the estimated coefficient on the measure of stock market variability is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that both large positive and large negative movements in stock prices tend to depress the production of consumer durable goods just as the uncertainty hypothesis predicts. The coefficient is also very large. It implies that, holding everything else constant, doubling the variability measure from its average value of 0.001 depresses the annual output of consumer durables by nearly 7 percent. 8. While the uncertainty hypothesis suggests that stock market variability and consumption should be related, it does not specify a particular lag structure for the relationship. In addition to the specification described above, I have tried several alternatives. Using the change in stock price variability rather than the level alters the coefficient estimates somewhat but does not change the qualitative results significantly. Including both the contemporaneous and lagged values of the stock market variability measure yields coefficients on V, that are nearly identical to those reported in Table II For consumer perishables the coefficient is positive, as the uncertainty hypothesis predicts, but not statistically significant. This implies that while the stimulating effect of uncertainty on reversible purchases may be present, it is clearly much weaker than the depressing effect on consumer durables. For consumer semidurables the coefficient is small and negative. This is again consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, which predicts that semidurables will behave in a way that is in-between durables and perishables.
The stock market index that I use is from Cowles [1939,
While the uncertainty effect appears to be substantial, especially for durable goods, the pure wealth effect of changes in real stock prices appears to be quite small. In all cases the estimated effect is statistically insignificant, and for durables and perishables the estimated coefficient is actually negative.
Given that the empirical estimates seem to support the uncertainty hypothesis, it is useful to see whether equations estimated in the period before 1928 can predict the behavior of consumption following the Great Crash. In sum, the statistical evidence is supportive of the uncertainty hypothesis. The behavior of various types of retail sales following the crash of 1929 fits the prediction of the uncertainty hypothesis that durables should decline greatly while more reversible purchases should decline much less, and in the case of perishable goods, should actually rise. The estimated correlation between consumer spending on various types of goods and stock market variability also supports the uncertainty hypothesis. In the prewar era, periods of high stock market variability tend to depress spending on durables, but stimulate (ever so slightly) spending on perishables. In the 1920s some of the forecasters did periodically express uncertainty about their forecasts, but these statements seem to be vague disclaimers, the essence of which is that forecasting is difficult. For example, Standard frequently included such statements as "the view itself is to be interpreted as an estimate of the probabilities, rather than as a cocksure forecast" [November 26, 1923, p. 375]. There does not appear to be any systematic pattern to these disclaimers, and they occurred at radically different times for different forecasters. Furthermore, they were never followed by statements about when the forecaster expected to be more certain as they often are in 1929. Thus, this analysis suggests that the tremendous rise in temporary uncertainty shown by forecasters in 1929 was indeed an unusual event.
1930 The apparent certainty of these forecasters may indicate that some of the uncertainty related to the Great Crash was resolved in the spring of 1930. But it is also possible that this confidence should not be taken at face value. Hoover's main response to the stock market crash and the ensuing decline in real output was to promulgate optimistic forecasts and to encourage others to do so as well. According to Standard, "officialdom takes the attitude that its function is to point out whatever is bright in the picture" [March 19, 1930 Table III. For the most part the postwar results are remarkably similar to those for the prewar era.'4 In the postwar era, periods of extreme stock market variability are highly correlated with drops in the production of consumer durables. According to the estimates, a doubling of the stock variability measure from its average value of 0.001 reduces the annual output of consumer durables by 6.2 percent. This effect is highly statistically significant and only slightly smaller than the prewar effect, which was a drop in the annual output of durables of 6.6 percent for a similar change in 14. As with the prewar equations, it is possible to try alternative specifications for the relationship between stock market variability and the output of consumer goods. Including a lagged value of Vt does not alter the coefficient on the contemporaneous value of variability appreciably. However, this specification does suggest some lagged effects of stock market variability. stock variability.'5 The effect of stock variability on the production of nondurables in the postwar era is essentially zero, and is not statistically significant.
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That the estimated effect of stock market variability on the output of consumer durables is the same in the prewar and postwar eras indicates that the difference in the behavior of consumer spending in 1929 and 1987 is unlikely to be due solely to structural changes in the economy.'6 It is also unlikely that the difference in behavior is due to some anomaly in consumer behavior in one of these periods because the forecast errors of the various regressions are nearly identical in the year following the two crashes.
Rather, the difference in behavior following the two stock market crashes appears to be due at least partly to very different levels of real stock price variability. Whereas the 1929 crash was followed by wild gyrations in stock prices, the 1987 crash was followed by much more moderate monthly movements. 16. That the results for the two eras are so similar, despite the fact that direct and indirect stock ownership increased by over a factor of ten between 1929 and 1987 [DRI, November 1987, p. 151, is also evidence that the mechanism by which stock variability generates income uncertainty is related to its role in predicting aggregate income, not to its role in generations asset income.
